Sunita Somvanshi
Australia’s AUKUS debate has shifted from submarine procurement to sovereignty. The AUKUS Public Inquiry has brought rival expert arguments into the same frame: undersea deterrence on one side, target risk and allied dependence on the other.
ASPI’s Michael Pezzullo argues that the program has restored direction after a lost decade, writing that the AUKUS program puts Australia back on track. The Australian Naval Institute published John Blaxland’s submission summary arguing that, on the available evidence, the case for abandoning AUKUS has not been established.
The risk argument has sharpened
The counter-case is also clearer. SMH reported warnings from Michael Keating and Jon Stanford that Australia is more likely to be dragged into conflict with China and potentially targeted because of the pact. Their argument is that integrated deterrence and basing arrangements can reduce Canberra’s freedom to stay outside a US-China conflict.
Pezzullo’s own testimony complicates any simple pro-AUKUS line. He supports deeper military integration and nuclear-powered submarines, but also says alliances are political documents and Australia should retain sovereign choice in any future conflict. That makes the live debate less about whether submarines are useful and more about who controls the decisions attached to them.
Karmactive’s coverage of the Hormuz shipping disruption and the wider Iran-war energy shock shows why military basing and maritime security can quickly become economic issues. AUKUS carries the same dual character: defence planning with consequences for ports, workforce, diplomacy and risk.
The inquiry will not settle whether AUKUS succeeds. It can, however, force the public record to address the trade-offs that slogans miss: cost, industrial capacity, nuclear stewardship, sovereign decision-making and whether deterrence reduces or increases the chance Australia becomes a target.
